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/ 
[L. A. 21005. lD Bank. Sept~ 19,1950.) 
RALPH M. DAVENPORT, as Administrator, etc., et at, 
Appellants, v. THE DAVENPORT FOUNDATION (a 
Corporation) et at, Respondents. 
[1] Trusts-Valldit)'-8ecret Intent.-A trust was not invalid on 
the grouud that it was not intended to be operative during the 
trustor's life, where the declaration of trust was a tripartite 
agreement between him, Ii board of trustees, and a beneficial')' 
college whi~ received payments from the trust, and operated 
under the terms of the declaration, and there was no showing 
that the college understood that the agreement was not to 
be operative, since any secret intent of the other parties 
that the declaration should not be presently operative would 
be immaterial. 
[Sa, 2b] Id.-ActioDB to Decla.re Trusts Invalid-NoDB1lit.-In Ul 
action to irlvalidate a trust ab suspending the power of alien-
ation in perpetuity, and as not being wholly charitable, the 
court erred in granting a nonsuit, where there was evidence 
which would support findings in favor of plaintiffs that a 
primary purpose of the trustor was to provide for his descend-
ants whether or not they were living at the time the declaration 
was executed, where a severability clause in the declaration was 
not effective to eliminate the invalid powers, and where the 
statute of limitations did not bar the action. 
[S] Id.-ConstructioD.-The practical construction placed on • 
declaration of trust during its administration by a board of 
[3] See 6 Oal.Jur. 304; 25 Oal.Jur. 295; 12 Am.Jur. 787. 
Kelt. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 53; [2, 6] Trusts, § 70; 
[3] Trusts, 1164; [4, 8] Trusts, § 75; [6] Trusts, 1365; [7] 
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trustees and the trustor for a period before bis death wu:~ 
entitled to great weight in its interprl'tation thereafter. ,:' 
(41 Id.-Validity-Partial Invalldity.-Assuming that a paragraph 3 
in a declaration of trust authorized the trustees to apply certain'" 
trust income for the beneOt of the trustors relat;ves whetbf'T 
or not in being at the trust's ereation, or for charitable pur- \ 
poses, the invalid and valid powers would be so inseparably,~ 
blended that the whole paragraph would fail, despite a severa- '.: 
bility clause having essentially the same dect as Prob. Code,-, 
1101. 
(6) Id.~tatute of LimttatioDS.-An action to invalidate a trust' 
on the ground, among others, that it attempt.ed an invalid;: 
restraint on alienation, was not barred by the statute of limi-
tations, where the trustees did not repudiate the trust, although 
they may have intended to hold under the express rather 
than the resulting trust arising on its failure, since with respect 
to the statute such trustees are treated as voluntary rather than 
as involuntary trustees until repudiation, and the statute does 
not begin to run in their favor until such time. ,/ 
(8) Id.-Actions to Declare Trust Invalid-Review.-The defen .. : 
that plaUlti1fs were estopped by laches from' bringing an action.' 
to invalidate a trust could Dot properly be considered on the ' 
review of a judgment of nonsuit. 
l'I) ld.-Transactions Operating as 'l'rusts-Deposits of MonQ"":-,i 
In an action to 'invalidate an alleged trust in a bank account,,, 
the court was justified in concluding that a trust arose when; 
a trustor of a foundation opened the account with another, '. 
and that such other beeJl.mf! the trusrtee of the aeeount, although 
a document executed by the trustor, directing the foundation 
to set apart for certain purposes funds derived from' the 
account, was in the future tense, where he had expressed his 
wish that the foundation should immediately become the 
trustee, the opening of the account was a sub~tjtute scheme, 
and the use of the future tense was not inconsistent with the ! 
present creation of a trust. . 
(8) Id.-Valldity-Partial Invalidity.-In an action to invalidate' 
a trust creating a foundation, and to invalidate a trust estab-. 
lished by the opening of a joint bank account which created' 
a remainder interest therein in the foundation, an invalidation! 
of the foundation trust would not affect the validity of the life; 
interests in the bank account trust, where the remainder and 
life interests were not inseparably blended. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa. 
Angeles County. David Coleman, Judge. Judgment modi-
fied and affirmed iii part. and reversed in part. 
[6] See 16 Oa.LJur. 428; 64 Am.Jur. 229. 
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Action to have two trusts declared invalid. Judgment of 
nonsuit as to one trust. reversed; judgment for defendants 
88 to other trust, modified and affirmed. 
R. R. Colby and Joseph D. Taylor for Appellants. 
Allard, BroWDsberger. Shelton & O'Connor, Joseph A. 
Allard. Jr .• L. A. Shelton, Brady & Nossaman and Walter L. 
NOSRaman for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR. J.-On May 23. 1939. Levi M. Davenport, then 
78 years of a~e. conveyed certain property to La Verne CoI-
Irl!'(>. 8 corporation. as trustee. The trustee was given only 
ministerial duties. The management of the trnst, to be knOWD 
as the .. Davenport Foundation." was committed to a board 
of directors of fivE' nampd pt'rsons who were to constitute the 
board of trustees of the Foundation. The trust provided: 
"REsERVES 
"Before distribution is made of any of the net in~me 
reserves shall be set aside as follows to wit: 
"(1) 25% of the gross income for taxes,supervISion and 
upkeep . 
.. (2) 12% of ~e gross income for replacements and 
betterments. 
.. D1STRIBUTION OF INCOXB 
.. All the net income available for distribution .hall be paid 
in monthly installments. as follows: 
.. (1) To the Trustor, Levi M. Davenport, the IIUID of 
l'-'our Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month, for and during 
the term of his natural life. 
"(2) To La Verne College. a corporation, the sum of 
'l'hret' Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month for the purpose 
of establishing a department of PHILOSOPHY and RELIGION, 
which department shall be established at the beginniDg of 
thr school year 1939-1940 . 
.. (3) To make suitable and proper provisions for the 
Sllpport and maintenance of J. R. Davenport, my brother, 
all his needs may require, not to exceed however, One Hundred 
Dollars ($100.00) per month. all of which shall be at the 
Ilole discretion of the Board of Trustees. In the ('Vent that 
any of my children should come to want. the Board of Trus-
tees shall use a· portion of ihe income to care for them in 
80 far as their needs may require, alJ of which shall be solely 
lritbin &be disc.retion of the Board of Trustees. 
\ 
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H (4') To American Bible Society, with its principal oflice 
at Bible House, New York City, the sum of Three Hundred, 
Dollars ($300.00), per annum, payable annually at the dis-
cretion of the Board. 
"(5) To the payment of annuities in such amounts u 
may be agreed upon between the Board of Trustees and the 
annuitants, who may add to this Trust . 
•• (6) All of the rest and residue of andistributed income 
shall be used by the Board of Trustees for such purpOsel 
consistent with the purposes of this trust· as may be deter-
mined in the sole discretion of said Board of Trustees." 
The trust then specified in detail the type of religiOlll 
education that should be provided at La Verne College and 
the manner in which successors to the board of trustees should 
be selected. The trustees had to subscribe to certain enu-
merated religious beliefs, and the Elders Body of the Church 
of the Brethren was given power over their selection and -
removal. The declaration of trust conferred usual adfninis. 
trative powers on the board of trustees and also provided: 
"Others may add to this Foundation, provided the addi- ': 
tional income shall be used in maintaining the Doctrines and 
Principles of our church, as herein set forth, provided how..-
ever, that the donor may reserve a portion of sucJJ. income; 
for himself or herself, or for relatives during his, her, or·' 
their lifetime. • . . . 
"In the event that any provision or provisions of this t,. 
instrument are or are adjudged to be for any reason unen- ' 
forceable the remainder' hereof, disregarding such provisioDl, 
shall subsist and be carried into effect . 
•• This trust may not be revoked nor, except as otherwise ., 
herein provided may any of th6 corpus of the trust estate . 
be withdrawn." 
The Davenport Foundation was incorporated in 1940, and 
title to the property held by La Verne College that had been ' 
conveyed to it by the trustol was deeded to the Davenport 
Foundation. 
Levi M. Davenport died January 6, 1947, and this action 
was then commenced by the administrator of his estate and 
his heirs to have the trust declared invalid and the property 
distributed to them. The complaint also stated a cause of 
action' to have an alleged trust in a bank account declared 
invalid. This cause of action raises distinct issues and will 
be treated separately. 
Plain~ attack the validiV of the trust, Drat Oil the Il'OUJUl 
) 
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that its provisions suspend the power of alienation of the 
trust corpus in perpetuity and that its purposes are not 
wholJy charitable. and secondly on the ground that the 
declaration of trust was not intended to be operative during 
the lifetime of the trustor and is therefore void as an 
attempted testamentary disposition. Defendants contend, 
however, that the noncharitable provisions are operative only 
for a period measured by lives in being, that the declaration 
of trll!';t is nontestamentary in character, and that in any 
evenT plainti1fs' cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. At the close of plaintiffs' case the trial court 
granted a nonsuit as to the causes of action attacking the 
validity of the declaration of trust establishing the Daven-
port Foundation. It is necessary to determine, therefore, 
whether there is evidence in the record that would support 
findings in plaintiffs' favor on the question of the validity 
of the trust, and if so whether their action is barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
The declaration of trust provided that Davenport should 
receive $400 per month and the use of his home rent free 
during his lifetime. The board of trustees were given power 
to consult with Davenport and absolved of any responsibility 
for loss resulting from following his requests, recommenda-
tions or advice. Plaintiffs do not contend that the reserva-
tions of these interests in the trustor would render the trust 
im'alid as an attempted testamentary disposition (see. 
Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570. 
576, 578-579 [140 P. 242]; Restatement, Trusts, § 361). 
They contend. however, that there is evidence in the record 
that would support a finding that the trustor did not intend 
the declaration of trust to be operative at all during his 
lifetime. They rely on the facts that the trustees appointed 
Davenport manager of the Foundation and allowed him to 
deal with the property in the same manner after the declara-
tion of trust was executed as he had before. These facts, 
they contend, will support an inference that it was understood 
between Davenport and the trustees that the trust was not 
to become operative during his lifetime. They rely on the 
rule thnt parol evidence is admissible to prove that a docu-
ment was not intended to take effect until the happening of 
a condition precedent. (See, P. A. Smith Co. v. Mulle,., 
20] Cal. 219, 222 [256 P. 411].) 
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the declaration of trust constituted a tripartite agreement 
among Davenport, the board of trustees, and La Verne Col-
lege. There is no evidence that La Verne College understood I 
that the declaration of trust was not intended to be presently , 
operative. It was a party to the declaration of trust and 
operated under its terms. It received the paymeuts provided 
for it and used the money according to the directions set forth 
in the declaration of trust. Under these circumstances, any 
secret intent of Davenport and the trustees that the declara-
tion of trust should not be presently operative would be -
immaterial. (Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128, 
133-134 [48 P.2d 13]; Watson v. Peyton, 10 Cal.2d 156, 158 
[73 P.2d 906].) Accordingly, plaintiffs' contention that the 
trust is invalid because it was not intended to be operative 
during the trustor 's lif~time cannot be sustained. 
The parties agree that an irrevocable trust, although par-
tially charitable. is invalid to the extent that under its terms 
the trustees may appJy the inCODl~ or corpus to noncharitable 
purposes after the lapse of the statutory period of lives in 
being or 25 years from its creation. (Civ. Code, §§ 715, 716; 
Estate of Sutro, 155 Cal. 727, 734-736 [102 P. 920]; see, 
Restatement, Trnsts, § 398.) The only express statem~l!~ of 
the purposes of the Davenport trust are found in the six 
paragraphs dealing with the distribution of income. The 
first of these, $400 per month to the trustor for life, presentS 
no problem since the payments terminate on the trustor's 
death. The second and fourth are concededly charitable and 1 
hence valid, although the payments may continue beyond the_ 
statutory period. The parties' conflicting contentions with 
respect to the correct interpretation of the other paragraphs 
may be briefly summarized. 
The third paragraph provides for payments to the children 
of the trustor. If the word "children" includes children 
who might be born after the creation of the trust, this para-
graph would permit distribution of income for noncharitable 
purposes for longer than the statutory period. Defendants 
contend, however, that in view of the advanced age of the 
trustor the word "children '; may properly be interpreted as 
referring only to then living children. (See, Restatement, 
Property, § 243, illus. 4.) 
1'he fifth paragraph provides for the payment of annuities 
to persons who may add to the trust. Plaintiffs contend that 
nnder this paragraph the trustees could use income from the 
original trust corpus to pay annuitants who later contributed _~ 
1 
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to the trust but who were not yet in being at the time of ita 
creation. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that para-
graph five is governed by the later provision providing that 
"Others may add to this Foundation, provided the additional 
income shall be used in maintaining the Doctrines and Prin-
ciples of our church, as herein set forth, provided however, 
that the donor may reserve a portion of such income for 
himself or herself, or for relatives during his, her, or their 
lifetime. " As so limited, they contend paragraph five only 
provides for the later creation of separate trusts whose non-
charitable purposes will terminate within lives in being at the \ 
time of their creation. 
Paragraph six provides that .. All of the rest and residue \, 
of undistributed income shall be used by the Board of Trus-
tees for such purposes consistent with the purposes of this 
trust as may be determined in the sole discretion of said 
Board of Trustees." Plaintiffs contend that under this 
paragraph income could be used for any purpose consistent 
with the purposes of the foregoing five paragraphs. They 
contend that payments to descendants or other relatives of 
the trustor born after the creation of the trust would be for 
a purpose consistent with payments to himself or his brother 
or his children. Thlfs under their interpretation the trustees 
would have power under paragraph six to devote income to 
non charitable purposes for longer than the statutory period. 
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that when the instru-
ment is read as a whole it is clear that the words "purposes 
consistent with the purposes of this trust" can properly be 
construed as meaning only purposes consistent with the reli-
gious purposes of the trust. They rely on the extensive 
provisions dealing with the type of religious education to be 
provided at La Verne and the religious qualifications required 
of the trustees. They also point out that income from tha 
property of others who add to the trust must be used to 
"maintain the Doctrines and Principles of our church." 
[2a] It would serve no purpose, however, to attempt to 
resolve these conflicting contentions from an examination of 
th£' declaration of trust standing by itself. The record con-
tains relevant extrinsic evidence bearing on the question of 
interpretation that would support findings in favor of plain-
tiffs on at least some of their contentions. [3] The trust 
Was administered by the trustees with the assistance of the 
trustor for eight years before his death. The practical con-
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.~ struction they placed upon the document is entitled to great 
weight in its interpretation. (Woodbine v. Van Horn, 
29 Ca1.2d 95, 104 [173 P.2d 17].) [2b] The most cogent-
evidence that a primary purpose of the trustor was to provide 
for descendants of his, whether or not they were living at the . 
time the declaration of trust was executed, is the fact that an 
agreement was executed by the trustor and trustees whereby . 
one of the trustor's grandchildren was to receive $100 per . 
montb for life after the death of her mother. Given full-
weight the execution of this agreement would sustain a finding 
ihat under paragraph six the trustees had power to devot!' 
income to noncharitable purposes after the statutory period 
bad run. Granting a motion for nonsuit was therefore erro-
neous unless the severability clause may be given effect to 
eliminate the invalid powers or the statute of limitations bars 
plaintiffs' action. We have concluded that the severability 
clause may not be given such broad effect and that the statute 
of limitations does not bar the action. I' 
[4] The trust provision that "In the event that any pro-
vision or provisions of this instrument are or are adjudged 
to be for any reason unenforceable the remainder hereof, .-
disregarding such provisions, shall subsist and be carried 
into effect" states essentially the same rule as that laid down 
in Probate Code, section 101. That section provides that 
"Where {tbe testator'sl intention cannot have effect to its" 
full extent, it must have effect as far as possible." Under its 
terms the rule bas bf'en established that" 'valid trusts should 
not be disregarded because in the instrument creating them . 
one particular invalid tru~t is df'clared, unless the latter is . 
so inseparably blended with the others that it cannot be l 
eliminated without destroying the main intent of the trustor, 
or working manifest injustice to the other beneficiaries.'" 
(Estate of Micheletti. 24 Ca1.2d 904, 909 [151 P.2d 833].) 
It is assumed for the purposes of applying this rule in review-
ing the judgment of nonsuit that under paragraph six the 
trustor intended the trustees to have discretion to apply the 
remainder of the income for the benefit of relatives of his, 
whether in being or not at the time of the creation of the 
trust, or for charitable purposes. The choice is stated to be 
in the sole discretion of the trustees. Under these circum-
stances the valid and invalid powers under paragraph six are 
inseparably blended and the whole paragraph must fail. 
(Estate of 8utro, 155 Cal. 727, 734-735 [102 P. 920J; Estat, 
~ Kline, 138 Cal.App. 514, 520 [32 P.2d 677); Edat, oj 
~,: 
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Vance, 11B Cal.App. 163, 164-165 [4 P.2d 977].) Since the 
nonsuit must therefore be reversed, no purpose would be 
served by attempting to determine at this time in the absence 
of findings based upon all the evidence the extent to which 
other provisions of the trust may be severable from the invalid 
provisions, if any. (See, Restatement, Trusts, § 39B.) 
[5] To the extent that the express trust may be found to 
have failed because of an invalid restraint on alienation, 
La: Verne College and its successor trustee, the Davenport 
Foundation, will have held the legal title to the property on a 
resulting trust for the trustor and his heirs. (See, Bainbridge 
v. Stoner, 16 Ca1.2d 423, 428 [106 P.2d 423].) Defendants do 
not dispute the rules that ordinarily the trustee of a resulting \ 
trust is considered a voluntary trustee and that the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run in favor of a voluntary \ 
trustee until he repudiates the trust. (See, Berniker v. 
Berniker, 30 Ca1.2d 439, 447·448 [182 P.2d 557J.) They 
contend, however. that in this case the trustees were involun-
tary resulting trustees because they intended to hold under 
the express trust rather than under the resulting trust. They 
thus seek to distinguish the purchase money resulting trust 
cases where the trnstee not only voluntarily holds in trust 
but intends to hold for the resulting beneficiary. It is gen-
erally held, however, that' it is immaterial whether the trustee 
intends to hold for the resulting beneficiary or for the intended 
beneficiary of the invalid express trust. With respect to the 
statute of limitations, he is treated as a voluntary trustee so 
long as he does not repudiate the trust. (See, 3 Scott on 
Trusts, § 409, pp. 2]73-2]74; 1 Nossaman, Trust Administra-
tion and Taxation, § 117, pp. 111-113, and eases cited.) 
Any other rule would allow a trustor to evade prohibitions 
against restraint of alienation and perpetuities by establishing 
an invalid trust and merely refraining from attacking it until 
the statute of limitations bad run. 
Defendants contend, however, that the cases of Page v. 
Page, 143 Cal. 602 [77 P. 452], and Mackenzie v. LOR AngeZe& 
Trust etc. Bk., 39 Cal.App. 247 (178 P. 557], establish the rule 
in California thAt in the case of a resulting trust arising 
because of the failure of an express trust, as distinct from the 
cas!' of a purchase money rel'll1Jting trust, no repudiation is 
necessary to start the statute of limitations running in favor 
of the trnste!'. The baRis of the decision in thf' Page case is 
bot entirely clear, and the statement relied upon in the 
) 
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Mackenzie case is dictum. Neither of these cases has been 
followed by later decisions of the California courts that have 
consistently classified resulting trusts of both types as volun- 1 
tary trusts for the purposes· of the statute of limitations. 
(Steiner v. Amsel, 18 Ca1.2d 48, 54-55 [112 P.2d 635]; 
Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Ca1.2d 423, 428-429 [106 P.2d 423] ; 
see, Ruddick v. Albertson, 154 Cal. 640, 643 [98 P. 1045].) 
Thus to the extent that they are inconsistent with the gener-
ally prevailing rule, the Page and Mackenzie cases- must be 
deemed to have been overruled. Since defendants never 
repudiated the trust, plaintiffs' action is not barred by the l 
statute of limitations. 
[6] On the basis of facts pleaded in their answer defend-
ants finally contend that plaintiffs are estopped by laches 
from bringing this action. They contend that La Verne 
College has seriously changed its position in reliance on the 
validity of the trust. This defense may not properly be 
considered in reviewhig the judgment of nonsuit, . ..flnd in any 
event it would be obviated if on retrial it were determined 
that the provisio:::ls for the benefit of the college are severable 
from the remainder of the trust. 
Shortly before his death Davenport decided that he should 
make some provision for ten or twelve nephews and nieces. 
He considered the possibility of adding $10,000 to the Foun-
dation and giving the trustees discretionary power to provide 
up to $1,000 for each nephew or niece if he or she should 
have special need for it. Instead, however, on November 23, 
1946, he went to his bank with defendant Steinour, treasurer 
of the Foundation, to make arrangements with the bank to 
hold an account he had in such a way that Stein our could 
dispose of it after his death for the benefit of the nieces and 
nephews and the Foundation. An officer of the bank told 
Davenport that the bank could take no responsibility and 
suggested that Davenport open a joint account with a person 
whom he trusted to carry out his wishes. Davenport then 
transferred the money in his account into a joint account in 
his and Steinour's names. After he and Steinour left the 
bank, Davenport executed the following document: 
"11-23-46 
"I am directing the Davenport Foundation Inc. to set 
apart funds sufficient to hold $1000.00 in the interest of the 
fol1owing-: rT;i8t of 12 relativeR of Davenport.] 
"TbilS $1000.00 for each shall be set apart from funda 
) 
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derived from a personal bank account now in the Security-
First National Bank at 230 Ea. Colorado St. Pasadena, Calif. 
"The purpose is to have this, $1000.00 to be a part of 
Foundation except that if any of tliese above named persons 
are in special need, he or she shall appeal for a portion to 
the $1000. to their interest, and the Foundation may allot 
to such person for their need from this personal fund. 
"Signed L. M. Davenport." 
The trial court did not grant a nonsuit on the cause of 
action by which plaintiffs sought to secure title to the joint 
bank account, but at the close of the trial made findings in 
defendants' favor. The court found that in opening the 
joint account and executing the directive Davenport created 
a trust of which Steinour was trustee. The beneficiaries were 
the named relatives during their lifetimes and thereafter the 
Davenport Foundation. The purpose of the trust was to 
provide funds for the named relatives if they should be in 
need and to add to the assets of the Foundation. The Foun-
dation, however, filed a disclaimer of any interest in the fund. 
[7] Plaintiffs contend that no trust was created because 
Daven.P9nJ~jdpot int~~d a trust to arise until after his death ; 
that he merel, appointed Steinour his agent to carry out· his 
wishes after his death. They rely on the use of the future 
tense in the directive to· show that no trust was created at 
the time of its execution. There was substantial evidence, 
however, to support an inference that by opening the joint 
account Davenport effectively created the trust. He had 
expressed his wish that the Foundation should immediately 
become the trustee. Opening the joint account was a substi-
tute scheme adopted because of uncertainty over the tax 
consequences of giving the money directly to the Foundation. 
The use of the future tense in the directive is not inconsistent 
with the present creation of a. trust of which Steinour was 
trustee. Steinour wished to have directions in writing as to 
What his duties should be. The directive indicated that the 
Foundation should become the trustee when the bank account 
was transferred to it. It does not compel the conclusion that 
no trust was to arise until that transfer was made. Accord-
ingly, the trial court was justified in concluding that a trust 
arose when the joint bank account was opened. 
[8] Plaintiffs also contend, however, that the remainder 
interest in the Foundation is void because the declaration of 
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discussed above. They contend that because the remainder 
interest is void the whole trust in the bank account must fail 
and that the invalidity cannot be cured by the disclaimer of 
its interest by the. Foundation. It is clear, however, that I 
~e interests created in the life beneficiaries are severable from 
the remainder. Thus even if the Foundation trust should be : 
found to be wholly or partially invalid it would not affect 
the validity of the life interests. The life interests and the 
remainder are not inseparably blended. The invalid interest' 
may be eliminated without destroying the main intent of the 
trustor or working injustice to other beneficiaries. Aecord-
ingly, under the rule set forth in Estate of Micheletti, 24 
Cal.2d 904, 909 [151 P.2d 833], the trust in the bank account 
must be sustained to the extent it provides for the named·, 
beneficiaries. \ 
Since defendant Davenport Foundation filed a disclaimer 
of any interest in the fund, the judgment should be modified 
to award the remainder interest in the joint bank' account 
to the' heirs at law of Levi M. Davenport. As so modified 
that part of the judgment adjudicating the disposition of 
the joint bank account is aftlrmed. In all other respects the 
judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Cartel', J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
